In the first sentence of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Wilfred Sellars equates the "given" with the "immediate":
I PRESUME that no philosopher who has attacked the philosophical idea of givenness or, to use the Hegelian term, immediacy has intended to deny that there is a difference between inferring that something is the case and, for example, seeing it to be the case.
!Victor Badinage Quotes by Theme#^120e54
We must remain vigilant in not confusing recognition with signification. That is, we must be wary of using sapient praxis as the model for sentient praxis. Myth of the Proven leading to Myth of the Given. But how does the perceptual relate to the actual? The perceptual is not an arbitrary signifier presented to an enduring subject. Neither is the perceptual a deterministic effect of some cause "out there". No, the perceptual is an immediate conjecture of similarity to past experience. The perceptual is a selection from received sensations, to which subjectivity and objectivity have been attached. There is a strand of thought (advocated by Wilfred Sellars and John McDowell) that wants to label this "similarity to past experience" as "conceptual". As Sellars say, "the ability to recognize that something looks green presupposes the concept of being green". The ability to recognize that something looks green does indeed presuppose a great deal about time and space and how colours relate to the external world. But an incantory invocation of the word "concept" will not suffice to explain all the intricacies of this relation. If the history of philosophy is an indication, the attempt to "explain" the intricacies of this relation will lead us into all sorts of antinomies. Now this leads us to quietism, also advocated by McDowell, following Wittgenstein.