concept: Absolute Granularity
concept-key: https://vernacular.cloud/0.0.1/rd3UeRTyS5Dnd71DPebTgP5h/
Definition
Vagues, sorites, Ship of Theseus, personal identity, species boundaries. An epistemological and a physical and a metaphysical boundary.
!Victor Badinage Quotes by Theme#^5edd80
What we have is a taxonomy of first person instruments--the interaction of multiple localized structural-functional organizations. The bee and the flower, the seed and the squirrel, the fruit and the parrot. Each sorting the other, according to its norms, into categories of compatibility and incompatibility.
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Notes
History Note
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You *can* call it the “Problem of Granularity,” and it actually captures a real intuition—but philosophers would push back in a few predictable ways. The objections aren’t that it’s wrong so much as that it risks **blurring distinctions they care about keeping separate**.
Here are the main lines of resistance you’d likely get:
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1. “Granularity” sounds epistemic, not metaphysical
Philosophers will ask: is the problem about **reality** or about **how we describe reality**?
In the **Sorites Paradox**, many (like Timothy Williamson) argue the boundary *is sharp*, even if we can’t know it.
Your term “granularity” suggests the world itself might come in different “resolutions,” which sounds more like a **modeling limitation** than a feature of reality.
**Objection:** You may be smuggling in the idea that vagueness is about *our coarse-grained descriptions*, rather than something deep about truth or existence.
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2. It risks collapsing distinct problems into one
Philosophers tend to treat these as importantly different:
**Vagueness** (Sorites): borderline cases in predicates (“heap,” “bald”)
**Identity over time** (Ship of Theseus): persistence under change
**Natural kinds / speciation**: whether divisions in nature are real or conventional
People like Derek Parfit explicitly argue that identity questions are *not* just vagueness problems—they’re about **what matters in survival**, not just fuzzy boundaries.
**Objection:** “Granularity” might flatten genuinely different metaphysical issues into one bucket.
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3. It suggests arbitrariness where some see structure
Take speciation:
Biologists and philosophers like David Hull argue species are **historical lineages**, not arbitrary slices.
Similarly, some argue natural kinds have real structure even if boundaries are messy.
**Objection:** “Granularity” can sound like *all* divisions are arbitrary—many philosophers think that’s too strong.
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4. It doesn’t capture the logical paradox aspect
The Sorites isn’t just about “where do we draw the line?”—it’s about a **valid-looking argument leading to contradiction**:
If 1 grain isn’t a heap, and adding 1 grain never makes a difference, then no number makes a heap.
Philosophers like Kit Fine focus on the **logic of tolerance and boundary failure**, not just scale or resolution.
**Objection:** “Granularity” sounds like a descriptive issue, but Sorites is a **formal paradox**.
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5. It may bias toward certain solutions
Your framing subtly leans toward:
**Fuzzy logic**
Degree-based truth
Continuum metaphysics
But other camps exist:
**Epistemicism** (Williamson): sharp boundaries, unknowable
**Supervaluationism**: multiple precise “sharpenings”
**Contextualism**: boundaries shift with context
**Objection:** The term “granularity” might prejudge the debate in favor of *graded* or *continuous* solutions.
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6. It’s not historically anchored
Philosophy tends to organize problems around established traditions:
“Vagueness”
“Identity over time”
“Universals and natural kinds”
Your label is novel, which is good—but:
**Objection:** It lacks lineage, so philosophers may resist it as *rebranding rather than clarifying*.
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Where your idea *works well*
Despite objections, “Problem of Granularity” does capture something real:
It highlights **scale-dependence**
It unifies **gradual change + boundary formation**
It resonates with science (evolution, phase transitions, computation)
It’s especially strong if you frame it like this:
> Different problems arise when **continuous underlying processes are forced into discrete conceptual categories**.
That’s a respectable, even powerful, unifying thesis.
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A refined version that might land better
If you wanted philosophers to take it seriously, you might position it as:
A **meta-problem** about how vagueness, identity, and natural kinds relate
Not a replacement, but a **higher-level lens**
Something like:
> “The Problem of Granularity: how discrete judgments emerge from continuous reality.”
That framing avoids stepping on existing debates while still offering a unifying insight.
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Bottom line
Philosophers wouldn’t reject your idea outright—but they’d say:
It’s **suggestive, not precise**
It risks **conflating distinct debates**
It may **bias the metaphysics**
Still, as a *research program* or *conceptual lens*, it’s genuinely promising—especially if you present it as explaining why these classic problems keep reappearing in different domains.