concept: MDNMIW
concept-key: https://vernacular.cloud/0.0.1/Dr7vgvXu6g2ubtHCU9OIfqEF/
Definition
There is but one foundational puzzle: the mind-dependent thought of a mind-independent world. Mind-dependence is epistemology. Mind-independence is ontology.
Philosophy must presuppose this tension: we aim to describe a world independent of us using conceptual resources dependent on us. This is not puzzle to be solved but a structural condition to be accepted.
Idealism collapses world into mind. Materialism collapses mind into world. Both are attempts to resolve what must instead be lived. Idealism and Materialism are both true, or both not true.
Ostensive language begins with a highly corroborated pragmatic theory of the external world.
Robert Paul Wolff: Hume's/Kant's Theory of mental activity. For Wolff, propensities and dispositions in Hume's philosophy function in the same way as concepts and categories in Kant's philosophy. Also Thomas Reid.
Sellars speaks of The notorious "ing/ed" distinction, for example "representing" and "represented". The act of knowing and the thing known. Badinage speaks of shifty words that attempt to straddle the MDNMIW chasm.
The "hard problem" of consciousness is the result of the contradiction at the heart of MDNMIW
- [ ] #Cite Berkeley on "a tree in the mind is not a tree in the world". "To be is to be perceived" But is there a difference between perceiving a tree (external reception) and imagining a tree (central reception)?
- [ ] #Cite Josiah Royce. "The world is such as ideas are made of"
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