Epistemic judgment is not grounded in a single criterion of truth but is suspended within a field of meta-linguistic constraints: foundation, correspondence, and coherence. These constraints are not competing theories of truth but are dimensions along which beliefs, opinions, and assertions are produced and evaluated.
Truth, on this account, is a norm which governs the discursive practice of corroboration. Conjectural assertions are offered within a vocabulary that has been regimented by these three constraints. A tribunal evaluates these conjectures with respect to the established vocabulary and offers a verdict of true or false--while reserving the right to investigate any presuppositions of foundation, correspondence, or coherence and the right to investigate the legitimacy of the tribunal itself.
This account locates the ultimate basis of truth and falsity in 1) the encounter between organism and environment: foundation in innate dispositions, correspondence in perceptual attunement, and coherence in the compatibility of possible outcomes, and 2) the legitimacy of the tribunal which renders the verdict.
In other words in a vocabulary, a domain which is ultimately supervenient on the notion of “mind-dependent notion of a mind-independent world” (MDNMIW). Which may seem like a contradiction if viewed as a logical axiom, but is actually the fundamental precondition of sentience.
foundation, coherence, correspondence
[ ] #Edit The distinction between assertion and an actuality (or reality in general)
[ ] #Edit The Tarskian version of truth is not deflationary, it is foundational, metalinguistic
The word true is not redundant. To say that "Snow is white" is true, is to say that it has been declared true in some legitimated tribunal. This is the grammatical function of stipulation.
A proposition has an asymmetrical relation to a situation.
enables the representation of associative (non-hierarchical) links, which can also be used to represent part-whole links that are not meant as hierarchical relationships.